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The premise of this monograph is simple: for all the 
talk of “unity of effort” and “unity of command,” without 
someone at the helm who has “unity of vision,” asymmet-
ric confrontations are hard (if not impossible) to win. 
In this monograph, Dr. Anna Simons examines a range 
of individuals who proved adept at seeing the forest and 
the trees, did not have to be taught to think in terms of 
branches and sequels, and did not need to be prodded by 
doctrine (or a President) to consider what the second, third, 
and fourth order effects of an action might be. Simons uses 
India’s extensive experience with insurgency to make the 
point that with the right who in charge, the right what will 
follow. She analyzes three exceptional Indians (K. P. S. Gill, 
S. K. Sinha, and Mahatma Gandhi). Yet, in doing so, she 
also makes the case that no one else can duplicate their ap-
proaches. So, what then might be gained by studying their 
lessons learned? For one, the Department of Defense and 
the Services should pay far greater attention to assessment, 
selection, reassessment, and deselection. Second, counter-
insurgency (and related) field manuals will always be more 
useful as screening tools than teaching aides when it comes 
to identifying counterinsurgency (COIN) potential. 
Intentionally provocative, this monograph not only 
challenges current ways of doing business, but should add 
a new dimension to the COIN strategy debate.
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute 
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vSUMMARY
What do we need when confronted by adversar-
ies who do not adhere to our rule set or social code? 
Drawing on India’s extensive counterinsurgency ex-
periences, as well as British and American examples 
of cross-culturally astute strategists, this monograph 
makes the case for frontloading selection. Its premise 
is that with the right individual(s) devising strategy, 
everything else should fall into place. The author con-
tends that certain intuitive abilities are key—abilities 
that no amount of doctrine can instill or teach.
The argument made here moves beyond “unity of 
effort” and “unity of command” to identify an over-
arching need for “unity of vision.” Without someone 
at the helm who has a certain kind—not turn, not 
frame, but kind—of mind, asymmetric confrontations 
will be hard (if not impossible) to win. As with stra-
tegic insight, individuals either know what to use to 
strategic effect when dealing with another society, or 
they do not. Having prior cross-cultural experience of 
the players involved in the conflict is essential, but just 
understanding other players is insufficient. Equally 
important is being able to come up with a strategy that 
fits “us” as well. 
The monograph identifies a number of individu-
als who used unity of vision to considerable strategic 
effect. It then moves on to consider three exceptional 
Indians (K. P. S. Gill, S. K. Sinha, and Mahatma Gan-
dhi) to further illustrate the point that with the right 
who in charge, the right what will follow. Among the 
conclusions reached is that the Department of Defense 
and the Services should be investing far more effort 
in assessment, selection, reassessment, and deselec-
vi
tion than they currently do, and that when it comes to 
identifying those with the right attributes, counterin-
surgency (and related) field manuals should be used 
as screening tools—not teaching aides. 
In addition to unity of vision, the author introduc-
es two other concepts. The Lawrence paradox refers 
to our propensity to turn unduplicable lessons into 
generic principles as if anyone should be able to ap-
ply them. In contrast, the Gladwell heuristic seems far 
more useful. Borrowing from Malcolm Gladwell’s no-
tion of connectors, mavens, and salesmen, what this 
yields is that those responsible for policing or helping 
to police communities at the local level should be able 
to identify local connectors, mavens, and salesmen. 
At the operational level, counterinsurgency lead-
ers should be able to think (and potentially act) like 
connectors, mavens, and salesmen themselves, while 
strategy itself calls for an individual who possesses the 
insights and abilities of a connector, maven, and sales-
man all rolled into one—akin to an K. P. S. Gill, an S. 
K. Sinha, a George Kennan, or an Edward Lansdale.
1GOT VISION?
UNITY OF VISION IN POLICY AND STRATEGY:
WHAT IT IS, AND WHY WE NEED IT
For all the talk these days about the need for “unity 
of effort” and “unity of command” when confronting 
enemies (and working with allies), neither is likely to 
work without a coherent overarching policy. To come 
up with such a policy requires something altogether 
different: “unity of vision.”1
Visionary generals are said to possess “coup 
d’oeil”; they can size up the tactical, operational, and 
strategic dimensions of a battlefield and see scenes as 
both the sum of their parts and as wholes.2 My con-
tention in this monograph is that individuals chosen 
to devise strategy in today’s asymmetric or irregular 
environment need a comparable kind of situational 
awareness. As in the past, we need individuals who 
see the forest and the trees, do not have to be taught 
to think in terms of branches and sequels, and do not 
need to be prodded by doctrine (or a President) to 
consider what the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order effects of an 
action might be. 
This monograph is not meant to challenge current 
conventional wisdom so much as push beyond it. It 
draws on recent research into India’s lessons learned 
regarding counterinsurgency (COIN).3 Consequently, 
there is a COIN bias to what I describe, but the gist of 
this argument should hold for any asymmetric con-
frontation in which we face an enemy who fights us 
according to his rule set and social code—which is 
likely to be any enemy we face in the future, unless 
we return to set-piece battles fought only among uni-
formed professionals.
2THE WHO VS. THE WHAT
Essentially, the argument to be outlined here is that 
far more attention should be paid to the who rather 
than the what of cross-cultural conflict. Bottom line up 
front: if we get the who right, the right what will follow. 
Unfortunately, Washington, the Department of 
Defense (DoD), and the Services lavish far more at-
tention, money and, ironically, manpower on the 
what. Just witness the effort expended over the past 
several years hashing out Joint, never mind Service-
specific, definitions for irregular and unconventional 
warfare. But—perhaps the ground is beginning to 
shift. Take Andrew Krepinevich’s and Barry Watts’s 
recent assertion that it is “past time to recognize that 
not everyone has the cognitive abilities and insight to 
be a competent strategist.”4 As they note, “strategy 
is about insight, creativity, and synthesis.”5 Accord-
ing to Krepinevich and Watts, “it appears that by the 
time most individuals reach their early twenties, they 
either have developed the cognitive skills for strategy 
or they have not.”6 As they go on to write:
If this is correct, then professional education or train-
ing are unlikely to inculcate a capacity for genuine 
strategic insight into most individuals, regardless of 
their raw intelligence or prior experience. Instead, the 
best anyone can do is to try to identify those who ap-
pear to have developed this talent and then make sure 
that they are utilized in positions calling for the skills 
of a strategist.7
Mark Moyar concurs. The point he makes again 
and again in his new book, A Question of Command: 
Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq, is that 
“counter-insurgency is ‘leader-centric’ warfare, a con-
3test between elites in which the elite with superiority 
in certain leadership attributes usually wins.”8 Or, in 
plainer English, the better-led side tends to prevail. 
Moyar eschews the current debate between those 
who favor a population-centric (such as COIN) vs. 
enemy-centric (such as counterterrorism) approach. 
Of course, as most small unit leaders I know would 
say, to be effective on the ground clearly requires 
that you do both: you cannot secure the population 
without killing at least some of the bad guys. But, in 
a sense, this is exactly Moyar’s point: Give enough 
young leaders with the right stuff sufficient leeway, 
and they will figure out what to do in their areas of 
operation. As for how to determine who has the right 
stuff, Moyar identifies 10 attributes. Individuals have 
to have, or be good at, initiative, flexibility, creativity, 
judgment, empathy, charisma, sociability, dedication, 
integrity, and organization. While he acknowledges 
that “the surest way to test an individual’s suitability 
for counterinsurgency leadership is to put that person 
in command of a unit engaged in counterinsurgency 
operations,” he also says: 
The best way to predict the suitability of inexperi-
enced candidates for counterinsurgency command or 
counterinsurgency leadership development programs 
is to screen them for the characteristics common to ef-
fective counterinsurgency commanders.9 
His recommended screen is personality tests.
Krepinevich and Watts are not quite so bold as to 
list a set of attributes or recommend a screening tech-
nique for competent strategists, never mind for those 
who should help guide grand strategy at the national 
level, but their conclusion underscores the same point: 
selection is key.
4Of course, identifying those rare individuals with the 
mindset and talent to develop strategy will not be 
easy. . . . The problem of selecting competent strate-
gists is much the same as picking future air-to-air aces 
based on intelligence tests, educational records, per-
sonality traits, or even performance in undergraduate 
pilot training. We simply do not have very reliable 
predictors of performance other than waiting to see 
which pilots later excel in actual air-to-air combat. 
George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower had simi-
lar difficulties picking capable combat commanders 
during World War II. Nevertheless, as difficult as the 
problem of selecting competent strategists may be, it is 
one that the U.S. national security establishment needs 
to face.10
Unlike Moyar, who does not single out cross-cul-
tural insight as a critical COIN aptitude (perhaps be-
cause he erroneously believes empathy and sociability 
are sufficient to help COIN leaders fill the “knowing 
the enemy” gap), Krepinevich and Watts believe it is 
essential that strategists know as much as possible 
about the adversary. They highlight the significance of 
cross-cultural expertise: “Looking ahead, the United 
States unquestionably needs to develop a cadre of ex-
perts on militant Islamic groups, China, and other key 
areas of concern such as Iran, North Korea, and Paki-
stan.”11 Unfortunately, Krepinevich and Watts do not 
indicate whether they think strategists need to possess 
this cross-cultural expertise themselves, or should sim-
ply be able to tap into it. But tellingly, those they cite 
as “experienced national security hands” under Presi-
dent Eisenhower—Paul Nitze, Allan Dulles, George 
Marshall, Robert Lovett, and Charles Bohlen—were 
veterans of experiencing life outside the United States, 
with time spent under the shadow of our then-and-
5future adversaries. As it happens too, these were also 
individuals who pioneered “national security.” That is 
why it is more than just a little ironic that among their 
academic progeny today are very few policymaking 
defense intellectuals who have spent much time living 
in the non-West, despite the fact that all of our current 
(and likeliest future) adversaries hail from the non-
West. 
Yet, if one believes the devil—and failure and de-
feat—lie in the details, this points to a real problem, 
particularly if one also believes it is impossible to get 
a “feel for” or “feel about” a situation second-hand. 
Add to this the fact that it is never enough just to un-
derstand the enemy. As Sun Tzu is always cited as 
saying, there is also the need to understand us. And 
then there is the need to understand how the enemy 
understands us; the iterations of who understands 
what about whom demand constant attention. 
 
UNITY OF VISION DEFINED 
If, meanwhile, we examine those individuals who 
devised successful strategies for besting non-Western 
foes in the recent, post-imperial past, here is one thing 
we can say: all proved capable of developing a fin-
gerspitzengefuhl (or fingertip feel) for another society 
organized significantly differently than their own.12 
Without any formal training in anthropology, such 
disparate figures as T. E. Lawrence, Douglas MacAr-
thur, Joseph Stilwell, George Kennan, and Edward 
Lansdale all proved adept at turning their insights 
about another culture to strategic effect. More signifi-
cantly, the strategies they came up with succeeded as 
instruments of war. 
Take Containment, which is now regarded as a 
major 20th century success, a grand strategy so mas-
6terful that everyone is casting about for its equivalent 
today. To figure out how best to thwart and counter 
the Soviets, George Kennan not only had to get the 
Soviets right, but his strategy had to fit them and fit us. 
It had to be so suited to the Soviets that we could de-
feat them without precipitating a nuclear war, and so 
suited to us that we could continue to execute it for an 
indefinite period of time. Or, consider General Doug-
las MacArthur’s success as proconsul in post-war Ja-
pan. Somehow he had to figure out how to shatter the 
Japanese commitment to war without breaking the 
Japanese spirit or causing the country to veer toward 
communism. Each man faced nested sets of problems. 
As for T. E. Lawrence, he had to walk the fine line 
of keeping Faisal, the Hashemite prince, sufficiently 
restrained so as not to precipitate an Anglo-French 
rupture during World War I, while in World War II, 
Joseph Stilwell’s thankless task was to work through 
the reluctant Chinese to liberate the Burmese from the 
Japanese. To do so, each of these men had to overcome 
all sorts of other challenges, like too few resources and 
theaters full of ambitious rivals. 
However, try to compare across just this small 
group of individuals, and here is what you also find: 
Lawrence spoke fluent Arabic and could out-Bedouin 
the Bedouin. Lansdale spoke no foreign languages 
and could barely hit a target. MacArthur was a prov-
en commander. Kennan was a mere Foreign Service 
Officer. Nonetheless, somehow, each proved able to 
identify that feature or set of features in another so-
ciety that could be used as the fulcrum by, with, and 
through which to permanently alter conditions. And 
they did so as individuals, although none did so alone. 
Kennan had Charles Bohlen, who may have been an 
even more astute Sovietologist. Lawrence was hardly 
7the only Arabist in the field. Lansdale’s partner was 
Filipino leader Ramon Magsaysay. Nonetheless, we 
still credit Kennan, Lawrence, and Lansdale with be-
ing the progenitors of successful policy. Being cynical, 
we might attribute this to their having written more, 
better, and/or first, thereby associating their names 
with “their” policy. But even if this is the case, they 
were still master codifiers. Somehow they were able to 
do more than just absorb the situational zeitgeist and 
operationalize it. They successfully explicated what 
others could not yet articulate. 
Perhaps it is too trite to suggest that these men 
routinized ideas by being forcefully persuasive. All, 
certainly, had healthy egos. But also, none could have 
accomplished what he did without a reflexive abil-
ity to understand “them” and “us,” and what to do 
to “them” without jeopardizing “us.” Consequently, 
unity of vision refers to more than just the repackag-
ing and rebranding of conventional wisdom or, as has 
happened most recently with COIN, the rediscovery of 
forgotten lessons learned. It is not a paradigm shift in 
the sense that Thomas Kuhn initially used the term.13 
Someone who can achieve unity of vision doesn’t only 
explain reality in a new way, but figures out how to get 
us from war to victory and thereby foresees how to 
change reality, too. 14
The Cross-Cultural Dimension.
In a sense, unity of vision begs a kind of under-
standing that is similar to what anthropologists might 
say all successful cross-cultural endeavors require. 
Typically, well-trained anthropologists take a bottom 
up approach; talk to anyone and everyone they can; 
compare what people say with what they do; and seize 
8on connections, continuities, inconsistencies, and in-
ternal contradictions. Really good anthropologists are 
as interested in learning from the past as the present, 
are more interested in “why” than “how,” and do not 
study others so much as internalize their point of view. 
The best anthropologists go on to produce analyses 
that even their study subjects find revelatory.
Ruth Benedict, for instance, used just such modes 
of inquiry to investigate a situation she could not ex-
plore first-hand during World War II when she was 
asked to analyze the Japanese. She did this by talking 
to as many Japanese and people familiar with Japan 
as she could. She paid attention to how the Japanese 
raised their children; spent their days; and thought 
about honor, the Emperor, sleep, cleanliness, depri-
vation, auto-eroticism. Everything was fair game be-
cause anything might yield a critical insight. 
But the same could also be said of Edward Lans-
dale and how he went about gauging the Filipinos’ 
mood in the 1950s.15 He met no one from whom he 
did not think he could learn something. Presumably, 
Lawrence was equally sponge-like with the Bedouin.16 
And, as Colonel George Lynch, commander of the 
15th Infantry said of Joseph Stilwell in 1937, “Stillwell 
knows China and the Far East better, in my opinion, 
than any other officer in the service”—a product of his 
“tireless curiosity.”17 
What—we might wonder—prompted such cross-
cultural curiosity in men who never enrolled (or had 
to enroll) in cross-cultural awareness training classes? 
As facetious as it sounds, “who knows” is the only 
reasonable answer. Some individuals clearly feel cer-
tain affinities others do not, just as some have com-
petencies others do not, which brings us back to the 
idea of attributes and the incomparable importance of 
selection. 
9Consider, for instance, what Krepinevich and 
Watts say about strategy:
Strategy involves more than enumerating what one 
hopes to achieve: it entails crafting plausible ways of 
achieving one’s ultimate goals despite limited resourc-
es, despite political and other constraints, and despite 
the best efforts of opponents to prevail in achieving 
their own ends.18 
 
“The best efforts of opponents,” emphasis on the 
word “opponents”—this implies that the mindset, the 
calculations, and the capabilities of the enemy have to 
be taken into account, which is precisely where (and 
why) one might think anthropologists’ methods of in-
quiry should be of service to strategists today. And in-
deed they are—but only up to a point. This is because, 
at best, anthropology’s contributions to assessing oth-
ers’ strengths and vulnerabilities can only (maybe) get 
someone partway to understanding. One also needs 
a deep appreciation for history. But even with both 
approaches, what no social science method can help 
with is how to intuit which of their features to turn 
into our opportunity. 
This is where unity of vision comes in. For better 
or worse, unity of vision requires an intuitive leap by 
someone who already has enough of a feel for their 
and our realities, and can then go on to sketch a con-
gruent, cohesive, sustainable plan, flexible enough at 
the level of implementation, but laser like in its focus. 
Conceptually too, such a plan needs to be easy enough 
for everyone up and down the chain of command and 
across government to understand.19 And, it has also 
got to be something our partners, whomever they are, 
will agree to.20
10
Do we have any such strategists today? Let me 
leave that question hanging for a moment to make the 
case for unity of vision from a slightly different angle.
INDIA’S EXAMPLE(S)
India has had to contend with a greater array of 
insurgencies than any other country in the post-
colonial period and, while no military has a particu-
larly impressive record of waging counterinsurgency 
abroad—and here India is no exception (it failed in 
Sri Lanka)—Indians have been relatively effective 
inside India.21 So, what might India’s successes teach 
us? First, that it would be wrong to conclude that suc-
cess hinges on cultural familiarity, familiarity that we 
might then mistakenly believe can be taught and thus 
learned. While familiarity is surely necessary, it is 
hardly sufficient. Rather, a certain kind—not turn, not 
frame, but kind—of mind is also required.22
Take, for instance, K. P. S. Gill and S. K. Sinha.
K. P. S. Gill.
K. P. S. Gill is famous throughout India and be-
yond for helping crush militant Sikhs’ efforts to turn 
Punjab into the independent state of Khalistan dur-
ing the 1980s and early 1990s. For a host of reasons, 
Sikh extremism was treated seriously by the Indian 
government; among them, a disproportionate number 
of Sikhs served in the Indian Army and the national 
police. But also, Indira Gandhi’s assassination by two 
of her Sikh bodyguards in retaliation for the military’s 
assault on the Golden Temple Complex during Opera-
tion BLUE STAR lent added urgency to the govern-
ment’s efforts. 
11
Gill was not the first man to be put in charge of 
crushing Sikh extremism.23 Nor did he do so single-
handedly. He worked closely with both the Army and 
Punjab’s civilian authorities.24 But the winning strat-
egy for rooting out the militants was largely his, based 
on a lifetime of police work.25 
Gill never formally studied COIN. Instead, his 
knowledge was based on on-the-job learning, begin-
ning with his assignment to the state of Assam as a 
member of the all-India Indian Police Service (IPS). 
This is noteworthy because after spending time listen-
ing to Gill describe his methods, two things about him 
become clear.26 First, from the outset of his police ser-
vice, he excelled at catching people in their own lies. 
Either he would listen to what a culprit said, detect 
the weakness in his (or her) story, and then investi-
gate the truth, or he would make sure he had gathered 
enough information before the discussion or interro-
gation even began to walk the guilty party right off 
the plank. Second, Gill did not just enjoy, but actually 
looked forward to, getting people to spring traps of 
their own making.27 In this regard, he bears an un-
canny resemblance to Edward Lansdale.28 According 
to his own and others’ accounts, Lansdale applied 
considerable wit and wile to helping Ramon Magsay-
say defeat the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines in the 
1950s. It is clear from Lansdale’s autobiography that 
he always tried to infuse humor into his operations. 
One gets the sense that he was also a great raconteur; 
Gill certainly is, which in turn suggests that there may 
be something more to a love of plot twists and punch 
lines than those writing textbooks about counterinsur-
gency realize. Perhaps thinking in terms of arcs, plots, 
and character development is critical to unity of vi-
sion. 
12
One thing often cited to explain Gill’s success (and 
something he cites) is that he was a Sikh and there-
fore understood Sikhs. He makes this point in The 
Knights of Falsehood: Not only was he from the same 
social stratum the militants were bent on radicalizing, 
but he knew the tenets of the Sikh religion better than 
they did, and therefore knew exactly how to turn their 
rhetoric against them. 29 He also had the forensic skills 
to make his charge stick—that they were perverting 
the Sikh religion and were “knights of falsehood.”
Thus, one lesson that could be distilled from Gill’s 
example is that it takes intimate familiarity with what 
insurgents are peddling to undo them. But this leaves 
two other points about his background unexplored. 
First, he was not just steeped in knowledge about the 
Sikh faith. He knew a lot about other religions as well. 
And he had a passion for poetry. Together, these avo-
cations would have given him ways to express himself 
that he would not have acquired simply by studying 
his opponents alone. Second, as a lifelong policeman, 
he knew the police; he understood what made the 
rank and file (and their leaders) tick, and how they 
could be challenged to operate more effectively. 
In sum, Gill could not only plug into the psyches of 
all the key players in the Khalistan drama (to include 
journalists, politicians, community leaders, etc.), but 
he had a well-developed feel for how to appeal to 
and/or outwit them all equally well, and he relished 
doing so.
S. K. Sinha.
Unlike Gill, S. K. Sinha hails from a very distin-
guished police family, but chose to devote the bulk of 
his career to the Indian Army instead, entering it be-
13
fore Independence and retiring as a Lieutenant Gen-
eral in 1983.30 Sinha subsequently served as Ambassa-
dor to Nepal, Governor of Assam, and, most recently, 
Governor of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). Like Gill, Sinha 
spent time in India’s Northeast relatively early in his 
career. He also served in Punjab during an early phase 
of the insurgency. Another connection between the 
two men is that they are both extremely well-educat-
ed and extremely well-read. Beyond this, however, 
Sinha’s insurgency experiences—and the lessons he 
offers in his lectures and published writing—would 
seem to fly in the face of most of those that can be (and 
are being) distilled from Gill’s experiences.
For instance, before being posted to insurgency-
ridden Nagaland as a brigade commander, Sinha 
“read extensively all the available literature on coun-
terinsurgency operations in Malaysia, Vietnam, and 
Kenya.”31 He also drafted India’s first COIN manual. 
As he put it, “Of course, the experience of security 
forces in other countries could not be applied in toto, 
and there was need to make suitable modifications 
to suit our conditions.”32 Among his innovations was 
an emphasis on what he came to call “psychological 
initiatives.” In the case of Assam, this meant paying 
homage to Assam’s rich culture and history.
Apart from the usual civic action programme [sic] 
like building roads, constructing bridges, organizing 
medical camps, providing veterinary cover and so on, 
the basic cause of insurgency has to be addressed in 
a subtle, sustained and specialized manner. In Assam 
the main cause of insurgency was alienation from the 
Nation through misconceptions. This was duly ad-
dressed through highlighting past cultural, civiliza-




Sinha did this by showcasing Assamese contribu-
tions to Indian culture at every turn, both inside the 
state (and governor’s mansion) and outside as Assam’s 
chief booster. His goal was to make “the people of As-
sam proud of their past and the rest of India proud of 
Assam.”34 In his view, highlighting Assamese history 
and culture was as important to achieving security as 
was providing physical security and promoting eco-
nomic development. Indeed, he considered all three 
equally critical to reincorporating the Assamese into 
India, and together they comprised his “three-prong” 
approach to counterinsurgency.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Sinha relied on the same 
three prongs in Kashmir where he similarly insisted 
on a unified command and on economic develop-
ment. However, unlike in Assam where he focused 
on oil refineries and tube wells to boost local produc-
tivity, in Kashmir he concentrated on extending the 
railroad and bringing electricity to villages. He like-
wise tailored civic action to specific Kashmiri needs. 
For instance, he supported a Department of Kashmir 
Studies at Kashmir University and helped emphasize 
Sufi traditions and Kashmiryat. Same method—some 
might say—different tools. Yet, was Sinha really ap-
plying the same approach? If reincorporation meant 
reminding Assamese and Indians beyond Assam how 
tied together they had always been, reincorporation of 
Kashmir required gently underscoring differences in-
stead—namely, between Kashmiri and Pakistani (and 
other “foreign” forms of) Islam. 
Here is where the devil lurks in the details, which 
means so might strategic insight. Imagine, for in-
stance, if we wanted to distill Sinha’s approach into 
a principle that could then be turned into a replicable 
practice. How would we codify it? Maybe: Appreciate 
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local history, religion, traditions, and priorities. Use what 
can be used for glue as glue and use what works as a wedge 
as a wedge. Or that, at any rate, would be one way to 
generically summarize something that could work 
equally well in regions as diverse as Assam and J&K. 
Yet, what does such a platitude really tell us? It 
conveys nothing about how to actually figure out what 
might work as either glue or wedge. It offers nothing 
concrete or actionable. It would not help assist any-
one who could not already read the local culture for 
himself, while the supreme irony is that for these very 
reasons it is precisely the kind of tenet a Sinha or Gill 
would never need. 
THE LAWRENCE PARADOX
One problem with the U.S. military’s current 
fixation on collating and disseminating COIN prin-
ciples and related tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs)—or, the what and the how—is that these are all 
retrospective, while (as most manuals acknowledge) 
to be successful requires that individuals innovate and 
improvise anew. This is what Gill and Sinha had to 
do—which is why what they did then became note-
worthy. At a certain point, each man may have real-
ized he was employing his own distinctive method. 
Clearly, Sinha came to think in terms of three prongs, 
and when he was assigned to J&K, he adapted what 
he felt had worked for him in Assam. Intuitively, Gill 
may have known only a Sikh policeman would be able 
to successfully crush the Khalistan movement. But not 
just any Sikh policeman managed that feat. He did—
a fact that will always be remembered once what he 
did is captured in the Gill Doctrine. However, as soon 
as such a distillation occurs, it also helps sweep from 
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view the real source of his success, namely his coup 
d’oeil, which is the very thing no one else can dupli-
cate.35 
Maybe it is not fair to blame T. E. Lawrence for 
this paradox—of reducible but unduplicable insight. 36 
Lawrence was, after all, quite specific that his “Twen-
ty-seven Articles,” which represented his compilation 
of what worked among the Bedouin, should only be 
applied to Bedouin. But, did he really mean this? He 
knew at the time he published his list that the Bed-
ouin were on the verge of change, thanks to the very 
Revolt he helped them orchestrate. Thus, it is hard not 
to conclude that Lawrence wanted people to carry his 
27 principles into other settings. He may even have 
hoped they would so that no one would have to rein-
vent his wheel. In other words, perhaps Lawrence did 
genuinely seek to prevent others from having to learn 
lessons the hard way themselves. But we also cannot 
ignore the fact that through disseminating his lessons, 
he was also ensuring that everyone would remember 
it was he who had invented the wheel. 
Lawrence belonged to a class and generation for 
whom blatant self-promotion or claims that he, T. E. 
Lawrence, was the real key to his success, would have 
been unseemly. Cleverly, he let others (along with the 
authorship of Seven Pillars of Wisdom) do this for him. 
But any form of positive publicity can help create the 
paradox: success attracts attention. Success signals 
that someone has done something new and different 
that works. It is only understandable that everyone 
will then want to know what worked and how to rep-
licate it. Ergo, the keen interest in distilling lessons 
learned while, when these are good lessons, it seems 
only natural that they then be condensed into prin-
ciples that can be taught. 
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Here, however, is where it is instructive to return 
to the examples offered by Gill’s and Sinha’s accounts, 
since the real substance of their accomplishments is 
to be found in the details of their anecdotes. Ask Mr. 
Gill how he knew what to do in a particular situation, 
and he has to describe the particularities of that situ-
ation; invariably it was the specifics of that situation 
that led him to play his hand the way he did. Indeed, 
in listening to Gill and reading Sinha, it is doubtful 
that anyone else would have done what they did quite 
the way they did it. Nor did they have to refer to any-
one else’s principles to know what to do or try to do. 
Instead, what comes through time and again is that 
these two men relished their ability to pull the rug out 
from under their opponents. They could no more not 
rise to that challenge than they could not read people. 
All of this was autonomic. 
But, if that is true, then is anything they did really 
replicable? Worth asking too, is to what extent was 
their vision context-specific. If someone has the abil-
ity to read people and the local scene in one setting, 
can s/he read any set of people and any local scene? 
Would Lawrence have been any good against the 
Huks? Could Lansdale have helped Prince Faisal best 
the Ottomans? 
As Brent Lindeman makes clear in a recent mas-
ter's thesis that focuses on pre-Awakening successes 
achieved by two different U.S. Army Special Forces 
team sergeants working with tribal leaders in al An-
bar Province (Iraq), individuals have to be considered 
in the round, and not just as the sum of a set of attri-
butes.37 This is in no small measure because the kinds 
of traits everyone likes to list are precisely those that 
certain military units (like Special Forces) already say 
they screen for. Yet, everyone in these units clearly 
does not perform like a Gill or a Sinha—or like Lin-
18
deman’s two exceptional team sergeants. This is also 
why Malcolm Gladwell’s notion of connectors, mavens, 
and salesmen may offer a more useful heuristic than 
anything anyone writing about COIN has come up 
with thus far. 
According to Gladwell, connectors know lots of 
people in lots of different social circles; mavens know 
as much as it is possible to know about a particular 
subject; and salesmen know how to get people to 
change their minds.38 Apply this to counterinsurgen-
cy, and those responsible for policing or helping to 
police communities at the local level should be able 
to identify the connectors, mavens, and salesmen in 
the communities they are responsible for protecting. 
They should want to do this not only because it is the 
most effective way for them to generate intelligence, 
but because it is the most expedient means by which 
to keep their fingers on the pulse. 
If we were to then think about foreign internal 
defense more broadly—say regionally within a coun-
try or even nationally—what should we want those 
at the operational level to be able to do? Presumably 
we would want them to be able to think (and poten-
tially act) like connectors, mavens, and salesmen them-
selves. After all, these are the individuals who need 
to stitch together the big picture. Consequently, they 
need to be able to think (and/or operate) comfortably 
across communities (plural) and know more than just 
a cursory amount about their allies and the enemy.39 
Push on this further and what does this suggest 
about those responsible for devising strategy? Ideally, 
those who devise strategy should possess the insights 
and abilities of a connector, maven, and salesman all 
rolled into one. Is it a coincidence that this describes 
the very varied individuals who have achieved unity 
of vision in the past? That seems unlikely.
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One More Indian Example.
Or just consider for a moment the man who may 
have been the 20th century’s greatest insurgent and 
counter to an armed insurgency: Mohandas Karam-
chand Gandhi. Unlike Mao (who often earns the 
title as the 20th century’s preeminent guerrilla war-
fare leader), Gandhi did not simply adopt and then 
adapt tried and true guerrilla warfare methods. He 
pioneered—invented, actually—militant nonviolence. 
Not only did he use nonviolence to help Indians se-
cure their independence, but, in doing so, inspired 
nonviolent movements around the world, to include 
the civil rights movement in the United States. Wheth-
er it should be Gandhi or Mao who is judged to have 
had a more lasting impact on modern perceptions of 
effective struggle, of the two, Gandhi was the clear 
cross-cultural master. He had to be to both galvanize 
Indians and hoist the British on their own petard.
By taking what he learned from having studied 
for the bar in England, Gandhi was able to cleverly 
use the Brits’ own legal system against them. In ad-
dition to understanding how important it was for the 
British to retain the moral high ground, he recognized 
how game-changing it would be if he could cut this 
out from under them. What makes his insights even 
more impressive is that to do so in the court of law 
was one feat. But to do so in the court of Indian pub-
lic opinion—at the same time that he was shaping 
that opinion—meant Gandhi also had to understand 
groups and castes he would not have been exposed to 
without purposely seeking them out. 
As hagiographic as Richard Attenborough’s 1982 
film, Gandhi, might be, it is still instructive to watch. 
It is hard to come away without admiring Gandhi for 
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being able to bait the British so effectively. By all ac-
counts, Gandhi possessed a keen sense of humor. He 
was also brilliant at improvisation. Even when he was 
only just beginning to feel his way toward Satyagraha 
in South Africa, it could be said: “he did not quite 
know yet what he was going to do, but he had already 
created an expectancy from which he would take his 
cues.”40 For instance, he certainly had not planned 
on rallying the Indian community in Johannesburg, 
South Africa, to take an oath of solidarity in Septem-
ber 1906, but, improvising on the spot, that is exactly 
what he got Indians in Johannesburg to do. Only as 
this happened did Gandhi realize, as he said later, that 
“some new principle had come into being to which at 
first he gave the name ‘passive resistance’.”41 
What is critical to note is not just that Gandhi in-
tuitively understood how to build his own momen-
tum, but that he did so by always teasing, testing, and 
probing. Anything could be turned into an opportu-
nity—to include the British urge to throw him into 
jail—though of course what helped him turn British 
strength into a weakness while highlighting Indians’ 
weakness as their strength, were his own strengths: 
his caste (upper), his networks of friends and follow-
ers, his deep knowledge of the law, and his gift for 
being able to communicate with people from all walks 
of life. In other words, it was his attributes as a con-
nector, maven, and salesman across different cultures 
that granted him the unity of vision to see how Indi-
ans would, could, and should prevail. 
IMPLICATIONS
 
How far can we push this Gladwell heuristic, or the 
Gill, Sinha, and Gandhi examples? Probably not too far 
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or they will tempt us to devise another “checklist.” At 
best, being a connector, maven, and salesman is sug-
gestive. One thing it suggests is that more should be 
made of individuals’ singularity, just as more should 
be done to mitigate the Lawrence Paradox. 
For a host of reasons, the United States should 
rethink the usefulness of counterinsurgency and ir-
regular warfare doctrine. Without question, most Sol-
diers and Marines need some sort of guide, or at the 
very least, left and right limits. TTPs, and “dos and 
don’ts” help serve these purposes. At the same time, 
few veterans would want anyone to have to learn (or 
relearn) lessons the hard way if this can be helped. 
But consider what doctrine draws on. There are en-
tire shelves full of books about best practices in COIN, 
unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, etc. Ironi-
cally, the best of these collate lessons from first-person 
accounts. In fact, this is exactly how the works now 
considered classic were first put together during the 
Vietnam era: writers drew on examples from World 
War II, Kenya, Malaya, and Algeria. Since September 
11, 2001 (9/11), many of these classics have been reis-
sued or their material has been repackaged and up-
dated by new authors. Indeed, there are now so many 
of these works in addition to new field manuals that 
no one has to go back to read first-person narratives 
at all. Plus, why wade through so much specificity? 
First-person accounts are too particular to time and 
place. Better to cut to the chase with genericized les-
sons learned instead.42
However, as this monograph has argued, the pen-
chant to genericize in and of itself teaches the wrong 
lesson. It implies that once the right lessons have 
been taught and trained, anyone should be able to 
apply them. Yet, history suggests this is hardly the 
case. More to the point, those who orchestrated suc-
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cessful campaigns in the past invariably broke new 
ground. That is why their campaigns succeeded. This 
was usually in the wake of something old and tried, 
which means such individuals came to the situation 
able to read and analyze it differently than their pre-
decessors, or they saw different possibilities, or both. 
Not everyone can do this. Nor can everyone assemble 
what amounts to their own doctrine from the vectors 
that others’ doctrine strips away—and especially not 
when the vectors are comprised of arc, plot, and char-
acter. Worse, strip out the specificity, and there goes 
the neighborhood, along with all the necessary con-
text. Or to put this in even more basic terms, if you do 
not already know who you can trust and/or do not 
have what it takes yourself to be able to quickly iden-
tify trustworthy connectors, mavens, and salesmen in 
someone else’s culture, it is doubtful that you will suc-
ceed. Arguably this does not just hold at the tactical 
on-the-street level, but at “god” level, too. 
A second problem with doctrine as it relates to 
cross-cultural contexts (as opposed to doctrine de-
signed to help mesh and organize men and machines) 
is that it requires too much updating. As it is, DoD 
is forever changing terms, which then requires that 
training be realigned with whatever are the new terms’ 
points of reference. In contrast, how much effort does 
the military expend on refining its assessment and se-
lection tools? Ask most of those who have served on 
advisory teams in Iraq about this. Or ask why so few 
of the military’s preeminent advisors—Special Forces 
Soldiers and Officers—have volunteered for military 
transition teams (MiTTs).
The law of averages alone suggests that some-
where in the field right now are individuals with the 
abilities of an K. P. S. Gill or an S. K. Sinha. But what is 
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being done to try to identify, let alone, promote them? 
Many might point to career progression and pipeline 
challenges as the problem. But integral to the wrong 
incentive structure is a more fundamental recognition 
problem.43
Among the things that could be done to ameliorate 
this situation is to use doctrine as a screening tool for 
assessment and selection. For instance, if COIN prin-
ciples do not strike individuals as generic common 
sense—if individuals do not respond to advice about 
the importance of establishing rapport or securing 
trust with “well, duh”—then these individuals should 
not lead others in COIN environments. In other 
words, COIN doctrine should probably be relegated 
to little more than a screening mechanism—which is 
not to suggest that COIN doctrine and history should 
not be taught. Rather, it is to take seriously the pros-
pect that if coup d’oeil is a trait and not a skill, then, as 
with the strategic competence Krepinievich and Watts 
describe, people either have this ability or they do not. 
Certainly, individuals thrown into novel situations 
might discover they have hidden talents they were 
not previously aware of, just as people’s vision can 
expand or contract with experience. But not even this 
will be able to be gauged if assessment and reassess-
ment, or as Moyar notes of COIN leadership gener-
ally, selection and deselection, are not taken seriously. 
If it turns out that coup d’oeil is context-specific, 
which it may well be for some individuals—like a 
Lawrence but not necessarily a Gandhi (who was as 
effective in South Africa as he was in India)—then 
“fit” and determining who belongs where becomes 
all the more important, if not all-important. That, in 
turn, makes selection even trickier, but hardly insur-
mountable since there are not that many people who 
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can combine the attributes of connector, maven, and 
salesman all in one, let alone also possess a fingerspit-
zengefuhl for the enemy.44 Again, the latter is not just 
critical for getting the enemy to undo himself, but no 
amount of COIN study, regardless of how many cases 
someone reads about, or Ph.D.s he has advising him, 
will suffice for being able to know what to do oneself.
Could this help explain why we have had so much 
difficulty since 9/11? Have we had anyone with these 
capabilities at the helm? 
To be fair, no one with the right kind of mind may 
have known enough about Iraq or Afghanistan prior 
to our return to these theaters, or those who knew 
enough may not have had the right kind of mind. 
Either way, what we did not have available in 2001 
or 2003—or, arguably, still—should speak volumes 
about the need to begin assessing and selecting now 
for the individuals from among whom we will need 
unity of vision in the future. One of the few silver lin-
ings to the protracted nature of both conflicts is that we 
have a very large pool of young Americans with con-
siderable experience abroad in difficult circumstances. 
Among them already will be those who do not like 
“them,” others who do not get “us,” many who can-
not triangulate cross-culturally, and some who have 
almost everything it takes but still will not be able to 
make that final leap of wanting to out-wile the enemy. 
If history is any guide, individuals with the right stuff 
sometimes make themselves stand out. At other times, 
the sun, the moon, and the stars have to align just so. 
Consequently, self-selection may require more than 
just a few strategic nudges, though overarching what 
we desperately need—a new emphasis on selection, 
assessment, and reassessment—remains the caution-
ary proviso that there is nothing prescriptive we can 
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be sure will work, not even when it comes to finding 
the right who to be in charge. But—get those who "get" 
this right and we will be that much closer to having 
the right whos from which to choose. 
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